The Action ar Spencer's Ordinary

Part 1: The Wargame and an introduction

In 1780, mainstream military operations in North America switched to the southern colonies as British strategy focused on the twin illusions that holding the coastal cities would provide control over the interior, and that the Tory majority in the South would be prepared to fight (rather than remain passively loyal).

Sir Henry Clinton’s capture of Charleston, SC, cost Congress 6,000 of its best troops – the worst disaster that Congress had suffered to date – but then Clinton had returned to New York City, leaving Lord Charles Cornwallis in charge.

The latter had his own ideas as to how the war should be fought and commenced a campaign of raids and marches across the Carolinas, hoping to catch and destroy the enemy’s forces (especially the troublesome partisan and militia harassing Loyalists and British bases).

Unfortunately, Cornwallis never quite caught his enemy, and his own forces – particularly his valuable and irreplaceable light troops - were gradually whittled away by crushing defeats, such as King’s Mountain and Cowpens, and the pyrrhic victory at Guilford Courthouse. Eventually, he became too weak to confront the reinforced Southern Army now led by Nathaniel Greene, and moved into Virginia in spring 1781 in order to merge with two raiding parties under Benedict Arnold and William Phillips.

Clinton saw Virginia as the mainstay of the enemy economy, providing food and horses, as well as cash crops (mainly tobacco) to buy uniforms and weapons from Europe. Soon after Cornwallis arrived, Phillips died and Arnold (never trusted by the British) returned to New York City and then England, whilst the growing force of Continentals under the Marquis de La Fayette, now included a crack brigade of Pennsylvanians under Anthony Wayne. To make matters worse, Clinton demanded that Cornwallis return the best units of his force, fearing that Washington and Rochambeau would combine and attack New York City. Faced with these factors, Cornwallis was forced to retreat to Richmond, and then to Williamsburg.

On June 23, Cornwallis sent John Graves Simcoe to destroy stores on the Chickahominy River, west of Williamsburg, which was achieved with little fuss. However, on his way back, Simcoe was pursued closely by La Fayette’s advance guard under Richard Butler, a veteran Continental officer. Unable to find a local Loyalist who would participate in a ruse de guerre to lure his pursuers into a trap, Simcoe had to rely on planting false information in the mind of a local Rebel, knowing that he would inform La Fayette.

As a result, Butler’s men spent the night of June 25/26 marching to attack a camp-site just vacated by Simcoe’s men. Frustrated, Butler sent ahead a group of 50 horsemen of Armand’s Legion, with 50 infantrymen riding double behind them. As dawn broke on the morning of June 26, they contacted Simcoe’s outposts, near the junction of the Jamestown and Williamsburg roads, and with Butler’s main force close behind, and decided to risk an attack.

The opposing forces

The two forces were evenly matched, each representing the elite of the respective armies. Units comprised one or more companies (infantry) or troops (cavalry); these were split into platoons (usually two) for foot units, and “divisions” for mounted units. They could use the close-order formations familiar in Europe, but the extended line and the skirmish line were more common, since these men could use their own initiative and fight in small groups under experienced NCOs. Given the varying terrain, both types of formation would be useful in the coming battle.

Infantry weapons were either flintlock muskets, or rifles (largely home-produced for the Virginians and standard issue for the Hessian jagers). All standard military-issue firearms could take a bayonet, but the American-made rifles varied too much in design and calibre – and were also slow to load. Despite their deadly reputation, the Virginians needed support from musketeers in order to survive close-quarter, hand-to-hand fighting. The cavalry relied mainly on sabre and pistol – the Queen’s Rangers generally ignored the carbine, whilst most Continental mounted units were usually unable to find enough of them to equip more than a handful of skirmishers in each troop.

What is also interesting is that both sides consisted of Americans, with small groups of foreigners (German jagers on one side, French and German “legionaries” on the other). So far as is known, only one man present – the commander of the North Carolina Loyalists, Eli Branson – wore a red coat (his unit was newly-raised and possibly still wore “civvies”). All other “British” troops wore green, whilst the majority of the enemy were in hunting shirts, with a few cavalrymen and the odd infantry officer in Continental blue.

(1) The “British”

By 1781, the Queen’s Rangers were known and respected on both sides. Formed in 1776 by Robert Rogers, it had fought in every major campaign since the operations in Pennsylvania in 1777. Now led by John Graves Simcoe, the unit comprised cavalry, infantry and artillery, and was typical of the all-arms “legionary” corps that was becoming the mainstay of the petite guerre in North America, especially in the South.

Accompanying the Rangers were two rifle units, one of Hesse-Kassel jagers under Johann Ewald – a man whose reputation matched Simcoe’s – and a mounted unit of New York Volunteers under John Althouse (or Althaus). Both units were serving with the Rangers on merit – Simcoe would simply not have “contaminated” his regiment with anything less. Also attached was a unit of Loyalists from North Carolina, who were herding cattle and guarding some provision wagons.

In terms of numbers, Simcoe tended to exaggerate the enemy’s and minimise his own. Most accounts give him under 400 men and Butler about 550. However, examination of muster rolls of the Queen’s Rangers from this period suggest that, ignoring the North Carolina Loyalists (who were performing non-combat duties), the numbers may well have been closer to parity, with Butler having only 50 or so more men.

Queen’s Rangers – Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe

[Approximate strength – 400]

• Grenadier Company – Captain McGill (36)

• Light Infantry Company – Captain Stevenson (37)

• Eight battalion companies – Major Richard Armstrong (285)

• Highland Company – Captain McKay (30)

• Hussar Troop – Lieutenant McNab (53)

• Dragoon Troop – Captain Shank (45)

• Rifle Section (mounted) – Sergeant M’Pherson *

• Artillery section of one 3-pdr and one Amusette – ? *

* These two units had about 12 men each, drawn from the other companies

Hesse-Kassel Jager Korps – Kapitan Johann Ewald

[Approximate strength - 50]

• One company of riflemen, in two platoons

New York Volunteers – Captain John Althouse

[Approximate strength - 50]

• One company of mounted riflemen

North Carolina Loyalists – Captain Eli Branson

[Approximate strength - 30]

• One company of infantry

• Cattle – 100 head

• Wagons – six

Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe

Educated at Eton and Oxford, he joined the Army in 1771 and served in America from the beginning of the war. In October 1777, he took command of the Queen’s Rangers, now seen by many as the finest regiment (certainly in the Provincial Line) in the King’s service. His leadership and unrivalled success in the petite guerre earned him the respect of friend and foe alike, and the confidence of the commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Clinton.

In six months campaigning in Virginia, he raided numerous enemy depots, capturing valuable stores and horses. However, with the reinforcement of La Fayette’s command, his primary role reverted to protecting the main army under Cornwallis.

By the morning of June 26, his plan to fool the enemy into attacking his old camp had not born fruit, and he had to focus on ensuring that the cattle and provisions gathered by the Loyalists reach his Lordship. Despite facing the possibility that La Fayette’s whole force might be near, he had no doubts that his Rangers would acquit themselves honourably, as they had so often before.

Major Richard Armstrong

An Irishman, with service in the Regular Army during the French and Indian Wars, by 1781 he was the only officer still serving with the regiment who had been appointed by Rogers back in 1776. Since then, he had fought in every major action – and most minor ones – in which the regiment was engaged, initially as captain of the grenadier company and, since 1778, as major commanding the infantry detachments. He even commanded the regiment briefly, when Colonel Simcoe was captured in October 1779. Although he was regularly given independent commands during large-scale operations, suggesting that Simcoe valued his services, there were suspicions that Ewald (technically his subordinate) did not rate him highly in military terms.

Captain David Shank

A Scotsman who had settled in Virginia, he chose to remain loyal to the King and joined the Queen’s Rangers in the spring of 1777. He served as an infantry officer until August 1780, but was chosen to command one of the three light dragoon troops raised to augment the cavalry component of the regiment. During the six months’ fighting in Virginia, he enjoyed success in the raid on Richmond, the skirmish at Great Bridge, and the capture of enemy stores and cannon at Point of Fork. As the senior cavalry officer present, he also commanded the hussar troop and rifle section, and Captain Althouse’s mounted riflemen from the New York Volunteers, although it was more usual for Simcoe to take command in large-scale mounted actions.